. 3 The Act is printed in full in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942) . It has been adopted in whole or in part in three states: Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Each of these states has enacted § §2 and 3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § §1902-1903 (1951) ; N.H.REv. STAT. ch. 594, § §2-3 (1941) ; R.I.GEN.LAws tit. 12, ch. 7, § §1-2 (1941) .
11,
4"Section 2. Questioning and Detaining Suspects. " (1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going. authority to peace officers to stop, question, and if necessary, detain for two h6urs, any person "abroad." Section three s of the act gives an officer authority to "frisk" or search such a person. The important element in this proposal, however, is that it purports to allow such activities upon a "(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
"(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed two hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be arrested and charged with a crime." Warner, supra note 3, at 344.
"Section 3. Searching for Weapons. Persons Who Have Not Been Arrested.
"A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he has stopped or detained to question as provided in section 2, whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer finds a weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest the person. The arrest may be for the illegal possession of the weapon." Ibid.
showing by an officer of a substantially lesser degree of mental con-,iction than has traditionally been required to sustain an arrest. Although the language used is not significantly different from the traditional formulation, 6 it is clear from the draftmen's comments that the statutory intent is to permit such detention in circumstances where the officer would not be allowed to arrest under traditional law. 7 The existence of such a power to detain as a constitutional matter under the Fourth Amendment, s however, was only recently presented in the Rios and Bonanno cases. Both cases involved interference with the freedom of movement of automobiles and their passengers on grounds substantially less than would have justified either the issuance of a warrant of arrest or an arrest without a warrant. 9 In both cases, the government agreed that the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for a formal arrest, but contended that the actions of the police in the instant cases were neither "formal arrests" nor "seizures" of the person such as would require probable cause. In Bonanno, Judge Kaufman in the district court accepted this argument.' 0 After Procedure (official draft 1930) speaks in terms of "reasonable ground to believe." The Uniform Arrest Act's formula is "reasonable ground to suspect." See supra note 4. It is interesting to note that in a recent decision involving this section of the Act, the Delaware Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issue by holding that "suspect" and "believe" are equivalents. De Salvatore v. State, 163 A.2d 244 (Del. 1960) . 7 Warner, supra note 3, at 317-24. ' The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause both for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480 (1958) , and for an arrest without a warrant, Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959) ; Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959) .
'Section 21(c) and (d) of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal
9 In Rios, two police officers were in a neighborhood with a reputation for narcotics. They saw the defendant come out of a building and get into a waiting taxi. They followed, and when the taxi stopped for a traffic light, they got out and approached it from both sides. There was no actual detention since when the officers identified themselves, the defendant became frightened, dropped his narcotics, and ran.
In Bonanno, the officers were aware that what would later be known as the Apalachin meeting was taking place on the estate of Joe Barbara, Sr. They had nothing but the vaguest of suspicions about what was going on, however. They set up a roadblock on the public road leading from the estate and stopped every unfamiliar automobile and identified and interrogated the occupants. Some of the defendants were taken to a nearby police station for further interrogation.
10 "I believe that the relative dearth of authority in point can be explained by the fact that few litigants have ever seriously contended that it was illegal for an officer to stop and question a person unless he had holding that no technical arrest took place under New York law, 1 he upheld the validity of the detention under the Fourth Amendment. "While the Fourth Amendment may be construed as encompassing 'seizure' of an individual, it cannot be contended that every detention of an individual is such a seizure."' 2 Unfortunately for present purposes, the case was reversed on appeal by the Second Circuit without discussion of the detention issue. 3 Moreover, in Rios, the Supreme Court ai oided a square holding on the issue by remanding to the district court for a clarification of the facts. Since
Rios was a companion case to Elkins v. United States, 4 which invalidated the so-called "silver platter" doctrine, the Court felt that further consideration should be given at the trial level to the legality of the officers' conduct. 15 Thus it has been said that the Court ambiguously by-passed the important issue presented." 6 This action, however, when considered in connection with 'probable cause' for a formal arrest." 180 F. Supp. at 78.
It should be noted, however, that the case can be explained on narrower grounds. The only question actually involved was that of the admissibility of voluntary statements made during the detention. Prior to the recent decision in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) , such statements were generally held admissible so long as they did not fall within the rule of Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957) .
" United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1947) , held that the validity of an arrest without warrant made by federal officers is dependent upon the law of the state wherein the arrest takes place. It is doubtful, however, whether state law is applicable to determine whether an arrest took place. See Gilliam v. United States, 189 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951) ; 109 U. PA. L. REv. 262 (1960) .
12 180 F.Supp. at 78. It is not clear whether Judge Kaufman means that it was not a "seizure" at all or merely that it was not an "unreasonable seizure." Compare City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959) .
"3 United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960) . Judge Clark, concurring, did mention that he thought the police action "highly dubious." Id. at 420 n.3. 14 364 U. S. 206 (1960) . State officers in both cases had originally obtained the incriminating evidence.
16 "For all that appears, this ruling may have been based solely upon the silver platter doctrine." 364 U.S. at 253.
16 "The court dealt with the issue with traditional ambiguity, returning the case to the trial court to determine when the arrest was made without giving explicit attention at all to the issue of whether a right to stop and question exists apart from arrest and, if it does, within what kinds of limitations." Remington,
The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest
Prizileges in General, 51 J. CIM. L., C. & P. S. 388, 390-91 (1960) .
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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF ARREST Henry v. United States,
r decided earliet the same term, at least suggests that some right of detention less than that occasioned by a formal arrest may exist under the Fourth Amendment. In Henry, a similar factual situation was involved; officers stopped the defendant's car on grounds substantially less than "probable cause."' 8 The detention issue was not argued by the government, however, since a concession had been made in the lower courts that an arrest occurred when the car was stopped. The Court, after noting the government's concession, went on to say: "That is our view on the facts of this particular case. When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was complete."' 9 Nevertheless, despite the government's concession and the Court's careful language, Henry was read by some as laying down a general rule that such interference with liberty of movement constitutes an arrest.' 0 If this interpretation were accurate, however, it would seem that the Court could have disposed of Rios by merely citing Henry; the Court did not purport to differentiate the cases on the basis of the factual distinction that in Rios the taxi was already stopped at a traffic light. 2 L Rather the "1361 U. S. 98 (1959) . 'sThere was some slight suspicion that the defendants had been involved in the theft of an interstate shipment of whiskey. The officers observed them loading their car, which was parked in an alley, with cartons of unknown contents. The defendants made two such trips; when they finished loading and drove off for the second time, the officers followed and waved the car to a stop. The subsequent search revealed not whiskey, but stolen radios. 9 361 U.S. at 103. (Emphasis added.) The dissent had something further to say about the government's concession. "While the government, unnecessarily it seems to me, conceded that the arrest was made at the time the car was stopped, this Court is not bound by the government's mistakes." Id. at 104-05. 20 109 U. PA. L. Rlv. 262 (1960) . " Henry could, however, perhaps be distinguished on its particular facts without adverting to the government's concession. Presumably the officers in Henry did not stop the car merely to question its occupants but to ascertain the contents of the cartons. Assuming the existence of a right to stop and question, it does not follow that this right could be used as a subterfuge to search. Where the authority of a highway patrolman to stop and check a driver's license was so misused, it was held that a resulting search was illegal. Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947) . Cf. Able v. United States, 362 U. S. 217 (1960) , where the court indicated that the use of an administrative warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution would be invalid.
Thus, it could be argued that in Henry, the purpose to search had to be supported by probable cause at the time the car was stopped. See Brinegar v. United Court seemed to indicate that a brief detention for interrogation would be upheld. "But the government argues that the policemen approached the standing taxi only for the purpose of routine interrogation, and that they had no intent to detain the petitioner beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission.""2 Thus it seems clear that, at the very least, Rios stands for the proposition that not every police inquiry and the resulting restriction of movement need be deemed an arrest.
It must be admitted, however, that this is about as far as the opinion in Rios can be stretched. The peculiar factual situation involved makes it a very appealing case in which to uphold the officers' conduct.n Moreover, the Court's opinion is ambiguous and, at best, touches only the periphery of the problem. Because of recent developments in the law the scope of any right of temporary detention has become of vastly increased significance. This is due both to the application of the exclusionary rule" to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"5 and to the recent decision in lVmg Sun v. United States, 2 which applied the exclusionary rule to voluntary oral declarations made during the course of an unconstitutional arrest. These cases, taken together, substantially increase the amount of police activity subject to the sanction of exclusion of evidence unconstitutionally obtained and, because of the exclusion of oral declarations, make the ability to convict more frequently dependent upon the legality of an interference with freedom of movement.2 At this stage in the development of States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925) .
2 364 U.S. at 262. 2On remand to the district court, Judge Hall upheld the police action on the grounds that there had been no actual stopping or detaining. United States v. Rios, 192 F. Supp. (S.D. Cal. 1961) .
'4 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) . 21 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) . In view of the very recent decision in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963) , it is clear that the specific requirements of the Fourth Amendment will be enforced against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The following discussion will thus assume generally that such is the case. For a thorough treatment of this subject prior to Ker, see, e.g S. 449 (1957) , whereby a confession is excluded from federal court which has been obtained after arrest and before arraignment, where arraignment has not been made "without unnecessary delay" as required by FED. R. Cri. P. 5(a). Arguably, the rule would not apply, since a "detention," rather than an arrest, has been made. On policy grounds, however, it is doubtful that such a distinction would be recognized for purposes of the Mallory rule. Moreover, under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) in full as follows: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 1 2 E.g., "For some years now the field has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire." Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610, 622 (1961) (Clark, J., dissenting); "We witness indeed an inquest over a substantial part of the Fourth Amendment." Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 374 (1959) 
A. The Formuktion of the Fourth Amendment
The abuses which triggered the demand for a protection against searches and seizures in the United States are well known; they were the use of the general warrant in England and its American counterpart, the writ of assistance, in the Colonies. 35 In England, the general warrant had UNITED STATES CoNsnTruTioN (1937) . ['Vol. 54 TIE FOURTH AHENDMVENT AND THE LAWII OF ARREST served a variety of purposes; it had been used in the course of ordinary criminal administration as well as in customs enforcement and the suppression of seditious libel. 6 Although Hale had early written that such warrants were void,3
' the practice persisted until shortly before the American Revolution when a series of cases 38 culminating in the famous decision in Entick v. Carrington; 9 held them invalid. Contemporaneously, in the Colonies, the use of the writs of assistance 4 was creating the first of a series of frictions which was to lead directly to revolution. The purpose of the writ was to allow search by customs officers for smuggled goods from the West Indies. 4 1 Its most objectionable feature, which distinguished it from the English general warrant, was that it was not returnable after execution, but was good as a continuing license during the lifetime of the sovereign. 42 It was, in fact, the expiration of these writs in 1761 after the death of George II which gave James Otis the opportunity for his famous oration against general warrants. Although he lost the case and new writs were issued. the importance of his eloquent protest cannot be minimized.
40
The importance of this history prior to the drafting of the Fourth Amendment lies in its indication that the chief concern in the colonists' minds was probably with the issuance of general 36 LAssox, op. cil. supra note 35, at 37-50. 7 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRONVN 110-14, 150 (lst am. ed. 1847). "And therefore I do take it, that a general warrant to search in all suspected places is not good, but only to search in such particular places, where the party assigns before the justice his suspicion and the probable cause thereof, for these warrants are judicial acts, and must be granted upon examination of the fact." Id. at 150. " who reported it to the full House in the following form:
"The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 4 7 Apparently, the full debate on the provision did not take long. Gerry noticed the mistake in wording and that the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" of the original Madison proposal had been left out and moved that the first clause be amended to approximately its present form.13 The motion passed and a further motion was made by Benson.
"Mr. Benson objected to the words 'by warrants issuing.' This declaratory provision was good as far as it went, but he thought it was not sufficient; he therefore proposed to alter it so as to read 'and no warrant shall issue. ' The question was put on this motion, and lost by a considerable majority."
49
Had the amendment passed in this form its scope as a matter of historical intent would be clear; the prohibition of general warrants was the sole concern of the "considerable" majority of the members of the House. The insertion of the protection "against unreasonable searches and seizures" was interded not to impose additional standards but merely by way of preface to the prohibition of general warrants.
In the next stage in the formulation of the final draft, however, the amendment reached its present form. Mr. Benson, whose proposal to broaden the amendment into two clauses had been rejected, was appointed chairman of a Committee of Three whose duties were to arrange all the proposed amendments. When the committee reported back to the House, the amendment apparently appeared in its present form and was approved without further discussion or comment. 50 Unfortunately, the records of the amendment's progress through the House is the only source of discussion available, since the Senate sat in secret session during this period.5 Yet even from the meagre background, it seems dear that the amendment as finally adopted and ratified contemplated something more than a mere prohibition of general warrants. By its division into two clauses the amendment was given a broader scope; the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was thus intended to have independent substantive content.
2 It remained, however, for the courts to determine the nature of that content.
B. Defining "Unreasonable"-The Development in the Courts
Although the history of the amendment may indicate that the first clause was intended to have independent substantive content, it affords no guide in determining the nature of that content. Faced with this problem, what were the alternatives available to the Court? It would seem that there were at least five possible interpretations which the Court could logically have reached.
Possibility Number One. Warrants will issue only according to the specific requirements imposed by the second clause of the amendment. The first clause of the amendment requires that searches conducted pursuant to such a warrant must, in addition, be conducted reasonably. If warrants are not involved, however, the amendment does Possibility Number Two. The amendment contains an overriding prohibition of "unreasonableness." All searches, whether with or without warrants, must be instituted and conducted reasonably. In addition, all warrants are subject to the specific requirements of the second clause of the amendment Possibility Number Three. All searches must be conducted reasonably. However, there is no such thing as a reasonable search unless authorized by a warrant. "The plain import of this [history] is that searches are 'unreasonable' unless authorized by a warrant, and a warrant hedged about by adequate safeguards. 'Unreasonable' is not to be determined with reference to a particular search and seizure considered in isolation."k Possibility Number Four. The Fourth Amendment imposes an overriding requirement of reasonableness on all searches, whether with or without a warrant. Normally, however, a warrant must be obtained or a good reason shown for the failure to do so or the search ipso facto will be deemed unreasonable. "When the Fourth Amendment outlawed 'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' 5 In view of the purpose of a constitutional prohibition against general searches, such an interpretation would seem untenable. Yet implications of such a view as regarding searches not instituted for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law can be found in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (state healthinspection). See Note, 11 SvmAcusx L. REv. 94, 97 (1959 -1960 Possibility Number Five. All searches must be conducted reasonably, but it is a flexible requirement depending on the particular case. "What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula."5" "It is appropriate to note that the constitution does not say that the right of the people to be secure in their persons should not be violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for the officers to procure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches."" "The relevant question is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant but whether the search was reasonable."" 9 At least two of the five listed possibilities can be dispensed with in a summary manner. The suggestion in possibility number one that searches without warrants are not subject to the requirements of the amendment has gained no headway with the very doubtful exception of the administrative search cases. 59 S. 217 (1960) . Even here the better interpretation of these cases is that they merely held that reasonableness is composed of different elements when the object of the search is for purposes other than the enforcement of the criminal law.
For a view that searches without warrants prior to United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) S. 132 (1925) ).
warrant will issue only in conformance with the second clause of the amendment. "If a search warrant be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue."'" Finally, it is clear that any search, even though valid on grounds of probable cause, must, in addition, be conducted reasonably.6 2 Broadly speaking, however, possibility number two, imposing an overriding requirement of reasonableness, seems to be the one which the Court has adopted. It will be observed that possibilities four and five are really nothing more than alternate interpretations of this overriding requirement of reasonableness; the struggle between these interpretations, however, has been the chief cause of disharmony in the search and seizure area in recent years. The early understanding of the amendment was in accord with possibility number four that a warrant was required to make a search reasonable, subject to narrow exceptions." The first of these exceptions is found in Carroll v. United States, 34 which recognized the necessity for dispensing with the requirement of a warrant when moving 6 vehicles were involved. The Court realized that insisting upon the requirement of a warrant in these circumstances would afford ample opportunity for the owner to remove his suspect automobile prior to the time the officers were authorized to search. This exception from the requirement of a warrant was thus grounded on a showing of absolute necessity on the facts of the particular case.
Because of this requirement of necessity the 
U.S. 132 (1925).
The implication that this right was expressly conditioned on an enabling grant of authority in the National Prohibition Act was negated in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) , where the Carroll rule was applied in the absence of such legislation. 65 In Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931) , the
Carroll doctrine was applied to a parked vehicle which could have been moved at any time. "In such circumstances we do not think the officers should be required to speculate upon the chances of successfully carrying out the search, after the delay and withdrawal from the scene of one or more officers which would have been necessary to procure a warrant." Id. at 701. the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case is overruled.'rn The final result, however, has been a blending of possibility number four and possibility number five, since two later cases 72 have held that a search of a home cannot be conducted without a warrant; Rabinowitz was distinguished on the sole ground that the search there allowed was incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, where no arrest is involved, a warrant is constitutionally required except in cases where a strong showing of necessity is made. If such an arrest takes place, however, a search 66 269 U. S. 20 (1925) . "While the question has never been directly decided by this court, it has always been assumed, that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein." Id. at 32. 67333 U. S. 10 (1948) . "The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies law enforcement the support of usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer.... When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id. at 13-14.
1,1331 U. S. 145 (1947) . Harris authorized a broad right to search the premises where an arrest took place as a search incident to the arrest. 69 334 U. S. 699 (1948 S. 610 (1961) . incident to that arrest is permissible absent any showing of lack of opportunity to secure a warrant. The validity of this distinction, turning solely on the existence of an arrest, is understandably difficult for some members of the Court to acceptY3
Whether Trupiano or Rabinowitz is followed, however, a further question of reasonableness arises in those cases in which it is determined that a search warrant is not constitutionally required. Under Rabinowitz, this question arises immediately since there is no requirement of necessity imposed. Under Trupiano, however, this question arises only if the Court first determines that a satisfactory excuse for failing to secure a warrant has been given. Assuming this first step is satisfactorily passed the remaining issue under either rule is the same-whether the search is valid as tested by additional elements of reasonableness. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not-to put it mildly-run smooth.... The reasoning by which the Court reaches its result would be warranted were Trupiano ... still law..... Since the Rabinowitz case expresses the prevailing view, the decision in this case runs counter to it!! Id. at 618.
The issue has been further complicated by Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), which authorized a search of an apartment incident to an arrest therein, but avoided relying upon Rabinowitz. "The practicability of obtaining a warrant is not the controlling factor when a search is sought to be justified as incident to arrest ... but we need not rest the validity of the search here on Rabinowitz, since ... time clearly was of the essence.... Thus the facts bear no resemblance to those in Trupiano v. United States... where federal agents for three weeks had been in possession of knowledge sufficient to secure a search warrant." Id. at 41-42. 74 An attempt has been made to find an absolute equation between reasonableness and the existence of a warrant in the Trupiano rule. "A valid warrant was a sine qua non of the reasonableness of a search. Thus vehicle search and search incident to arrest were exceptions not only to the warrant requirement. They were exceptions to the amendment itself,' Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cmt. L. R.v. 664, 683 (1961) .
This position seems to result from a reading of Trupiano as always requiring a warrant and a disregard of the decision in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 147 (1925) : "The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable." [Vol. 54 of securing a warrant wherever practicable, the answer was plain. "The authority of officers to search one's house or place of business contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid warrant of arrest certainly is not greater than that conferred by a search warrant .... , The implication of this statement cannot be mistaken; in order for a search to be reasonable within the first clause of the amendment, it must comply with the requirements of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant insofar as they are applicable. In support of this formulation, the motor vehicle search cases imposed a strict requirement of probable cause to believe that particular objects subject to seizure were concealed within the automobile involved 6 Marrmo v. United States ' ' is not to the contrary. There, officers armed with a valid search warrant obtained entrance to a speakeasy and arrested the proprietor. During the course of their search for items particularly described in the warrant, they uncovered other incriminating matter 8 not specified in the warrant. Their seizure and subsequent use in evidence was upheld. Although the Court used unfortunately broad language, 79 the decision authorized nothing more than use of the arrest as sanction for the seizure of an article found during the course of a valid search under a warrant." This interpretation was clarified and the 75 United States v. Lefkoitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464 (1932) . 76 S. 132 (1925) . "The measure of legality of such a seizure is, therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported." Carroll v. United States, supra at 155-56.
7' 275 U. S. 192 (1927) . 7 5 The objects seized were books and ledgers which the Court characterized as "part of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense." Id. at 199. Books and papers of mere evidentiary value are not a proper subject of search and seizure under any circumstances, however reasonable. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921) .
79 "The officers were authorized to arrest for crime being committed in their presence, and they lawfully arrested Birdsall. They had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise." 275 U. S. at 198-99. 80 "When an article subject to lawful seizure properly comes into an officer's possession in the course of a lawful search it would be entirely without reason to say that he must return it because it was not one of the things it was his business to look for." Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 238 (1960) .
It should be noted, however, that the mere fact that the object was lawfully discovered may not be enough. The Court, in Marron, seemingly rejected the suggestion doctrine of equivalence between the first and second clauses of the amendment strengthened by the later cases of Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States"' and United States v. Lefkowitz, 8 2 which condemned general exploratory searches incident to arrest and clearly indicated that the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment could not be used to authorize a search for which a warrant would not have validly issued.' 3 At this point then, a reading of equivalence into the relationship between the first and second clauses of the Fourth Amendment would seem to be constitutionally required. The only searches without a warrant which had been upheld were those of a motor vehicle where probable cause was required and search of a person incident to a lawful arrest.
8 5 The attempted use of an arrest to authorize a general search of the premises, although broadly supported by dicta, had been struck down in its only actual tests." 6 Moreover, search of the person incident to an arrest is broadly justifiable on grounds of probable causeY Since probable cause is a constitutional requirement !or a valid arrest, s a search of the person incident to such an arrest may reasonably be justified in two ways. Such a limited search may be considered part of the process of arrest, or probable cause for the arrest may, in itself, be probable cause to believe that articles subject to seizure are in the arrested person's possession. Each of these suggested rationales is both broader and narrower in implications than the other.
The rationale that such a search is really subsumed within the concept of arrest was suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in, Harris v. United States. "Of course, a warrant to take a perthat things so found were subject to seizure solely on the authority of the warrant itself. son into custody is authority for taking into custody all that is found upon his person or in his hands." 8 9 Under this formulation it would seem to follow automatically that a right to search the person exists in all cases regardless of the nature of the offense. 9 0 To this extent the power may seem unnecessarily broad, yet its necessity is readily apparent It is granted in order to properly effectuate the arrest; the -purpose is to protect the arresting officer. Even in the case of a minor violation it does not seem unreasonable to allow the officer to protect himself against a reasonable possibility that the person arrested is, in fact, a man of more violent disposition. Basing the right of the search on the theory that there exists probable cause to believe that articles subject to seizure are in the person's possession narrows the right of the search to the extent that the nature of the crime for which the arrest takes place becomes relevant. Thus, it would seem that, under this rationale, arrests for offenses of a nature which would not in themselves indicate the possession of a weapon or where fruits or instrumentalities are not involved, such as an arrest for a traffic violation, would not be sufficient to authorize even a search of the person."' The broadness of this rationale becomes apparent, however, when its implications in extending the area of permissible search are considered. If the search is allowed only for the purposes of effectuating the arrest it may extend only to the person and those things within his immediate physical control. If, however, the rationale is that probable cause exists to believe that articles subject to seizure are in his possession, no such automatic limitation exists and extension of the search to the premises becomes permissibleY Only in this manner can the searches in Harris v.
331 U. S. 145, 196 (1947) . 90 There would be no question about the presence of probable cause. Going further, however, if the search is clearly unnecessary on the facts of the particular case, it might be held "unreasonable" under all the circumstances. and no question of necessity for protection or to prevent escape was involved. Because of the broad scope of the search in these casesi they have been read as authorizing general exploratory searches, 6 which would not be allowed if therequiremaent of a warrant were imposed. As imight be -expected, the Court was urged to declare. the ,searches in both cases invalid on the authority of Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States and United States v. Lefkoibitz. s In Rabinowitz, theCourt said, howqyer, that they were distinguishable. "Those cases condemned general exploratory searches, which cannot be undertaken: by officers with orwithout a warrant. In the instant case the search was not general or exploratory for whatever might cbe turned up. Specificity was the =mark of the search and seizure here." 99 It is submitted that insofar as , Go-Bart and Lefkowitz rest on the prohibition of, a general exploratory search' 1they were. appropoately distinguished from both Harris and ,Rabnowitz. In eliciting a requirement of equivalence between the first and second clauses of the amendment, the basic test must be whether at the time the search 331 U. S. 145 (1946) . 339 U. S. 56 (1950) . 95 In Harris, the defendant was arrested' in his fourroom apartment which was then -subjected to a fivehour search. The basis of the conviction was false draft cards found in a sealed envelope in a bureau drawer.
In Rabinowitz, the arrest took placein the defendant's one-room office. The desk, safe, and file cabinets were then searched. -285 U. S. 452 (1932) . 91339 U.S. at 62. 100 It is extremely difficult to determine, the precise grounds of these cases. Lefkowitz, although regularly cited as a holding against exploratory searches, seems more concerned with enforcing the prohibition of Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921) , that papers of mere evidentiary value are never the subject of a valid search and seizure.
Go-Bart seems more directly to challenge the exploratory nature of the search. Yet the Court alluded to the opportunity to get a warrant and the failure to do so as a ground for the decision. Furthermore, the conduct of the officers may have been considered "unreasonable" under all of the circumstances. The officers, (a) told the defendants they had a search warrant when they did not, and (b) arrested the defendants under color of what was, in fact, an invalid warrant.of arrest. (The Court purported to consider the arrests as having been lawfully made without a warrant for purposes of determining the legality of the search.) began the officers could have obtained a valid search warrant with the information they then possessed."' It seems clear that warrants would have issued for the search of both the apartment in Harris and the office in Rabinowitz had the officers applied for them. In Harris, the defendant was arrested for check forgery and the search was for instrumentalities of that crime. Since warrants for the search of his office and car had, in fact, issued on allegations of the crime and his control over these places,'°' the conclusion seems inescapable that a warrant would similarly have issued for the search of the apartment. Similar facts existed in Rabinowitz, where the arrest was for possession and sale of postage stamps bearing forged overprints. Throughout the opinion the Court emphasized the strength of the evidence that the stamps would probably be found in the defendant's office, '1 3 and Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent clearly implies that a search warrant would have lawfully issued. '1 Thus it would seem accurate to say that the Court, in judging the reasonableness of a search without a warrant under the first clause of the Fourth Amendment, has impliedly held that an indispensable element of that reasonableness is conformance, so far as applicable, with the specific requirements imposed upon the issuance of a warrant under the second clause." 0 5 In addition, all 101 This is not, of course, the only aspect of equivalence involved. Quite apart from the question of probable cause, all searches must be conducted reasonably. See United States v. Costner, 153 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1940) . It would seem arguable that searches conducted without the prior sanction of a magistrate should be required to conform to even higher standards in this regard. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931) . 102 Record, pp. 28-32. 103 "There was probable cause to believe that respondent was conducting his business illegally. The search was for stamps overprinted illegally which were thought upon the most reliable information to be in the possession of and concealed by respondent in the very room where he was arrested, over which room he had immediate control and in which he had been selling such stamps unlawfully." 339 U.S. at 62-63. Io4 The entire emphasis of his opinion is on the failure to obtain a warrant. Although he never actually says that probable cause for the search existed, the following language strongly suggests it. "The arrest and search were made on February 16, 1943. On February 1, there was strong evidence that respondent had in his possession large numbers of stamps bearing forged overprints...." Thus, the government had at least seven, and more accurately fifteen, days in which to procure a search warrant. 331 U.S. at 85.
105 Arguably, this may also be true of the cases sustaining administrative action without the requirement searches, whether made with or without a warrant, must be conducted reasonably in the sense of reasonableness under all the circumstances of the particular case. To conclude thus from the abundance of cases construing the amendment in cases of illegal searches, however, is but to pose the problem; the applicability of this settled doctrine to the law of arrest is yet to be considered.
III. ARRESTS WITH AND WITHOUT A WgARRANT
There has been little discussion concerning the applicability of the standards imposed by the Fourth Amendment to the law of arrest.
0 6 The present absence of judicial development comparable to that in the search cases obviously creates difficulties both in terms of analysis and of predictability. Other difficulties arise from the expression of the amendment's protection in terms of "seizure" rather than arrest. This, too, the courts have left completely untouched. Despite the seeming use of "seizure" primarily as an aspect of a preceding search, 1 ' 7 however, several cases have held that the amendment's requirement of probable cause applies both to the issuance of a warrant of arrest' 08 and to an arrest without a warof a judicial warrant. In Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217 (1960) , the administrative arrest and search were under the authority of a warrant issued by a higher official. "It is to be remembered that an I.N.S. officer may not arrest and search on his own. Application for a warrant must be made to an independent responsible officer, the District Director of the I.N.S., to whom a prima facie case of deportability must be shown." Id. at 236, 237. In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) , the observation of a pile of "rodent feces mixed with straw and trash and debris to approximately half a ton" on the outside of the house clearly gave probable cause for an inspection of the interior. Cir. 1948) .
"'However, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) , the Court stated that it should be at least as difficult for a police officer to act without a warrant as it was for him to obtain the warrant in the first instance. "Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which an officer may act are more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent than where an arrest warrant is obtained." Id. at 479.
"I Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 39 (1957) . "If the search and seizure cases are determinative of the question, therefore, it seems almost certain that a congressional enactment of the Uniform Arrest Act would be found unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." ' 331 U. S. 145 (1947) .
11 339 U. S. 56 (1950) . 114 374 U. S. 23 (1963) . "' Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 249 (1960) (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.). "It thus could be held that sufficient protection was given the individual without the execution of a second warrant for the search." Lower courts have not, however, so limited the doctrine. E.g., Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U. S. 937 (1958); Bartlett v. United States, 232 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1956 ).
Searches of the person are, of course, allowed whether the arrest is with or without a warrant. E.g., Draper v. of course, not so limited. However, there are intimations that a showing that it was impracticable to obtain a warrant may be required to justify such searches based upon arrests without warrants."
6 Little discussion of a comparable protection for the security of the person against arrests without warrant has been found. In Draper v. United States," 7 for example, the Court upheld an arrest without warrant for a narcotics violation in the absence of any showing that it was impracticable to obtain one."' Indeed, lower courts have affirmatively held that an arrest may be made without a warrant even though abundant opportunity existed for its issuance. "If an arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has violated the narcotic laws, he may defer the arrest for a day, a week, two weeks, or perhaps longer."" ' 9 Such holdings may be based on a misconception of the common law rules which permitted arrests without warrant only for breaches of the peace and felonies. [Vol. 54 around the highly involved distinctions in these categories,"' and it seems to have been assumed that no obligation to obtain a warrant exists" -' if the arrest is for a felony. 29 It does not necessarily follow, however, that this is the case; the mere grant of authority to arrest for certain crimes does not automatically indicate that opportunity to obtain a warrant is irrelevant."
4 Early common law authority would seem to indicate that an arrest warrant was to be procured unless the delay would afford opportunity for the suspected felon to escape."
5
At any rate, it would not seem necessary to impose this requirement as a matter of Fourth Amendment philosophy whatever the state of the common law. Such a requirement, as in the search cases, could only exist through a negative implication from the second clause of the amendment, and the policy reasons underlying it there are not necessarily applicable to the same extent in the law of arrest. The justification for requiring a warrant for the search of a house has both historical and practical bases. Most of the legal discussion of the amendment has emphasized the privacy of the home as most inviolable 26 2 Moreover, the element of mobility, relied upon to justify dispensation with the requirement of a warrant in the automobile search cases,"
9 is continually present in connection with the normal arrest. Clearly, if the commission of the felony is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest, necessity in the traditional sense exists. Not only is there no public policy in allowing felons to go free while the officer is securing a warrant, there is also no justification for a requirement which may result in his ultimate escape. It can hardly be denied, however, that. reasonable police practice may indicate the desirability of postponing an arrest in particular situations. Often, it will be far from clear whether adequate grounds for an arrest exist; in other cases postponing the arrest of an individual may be necessary in order to apprehend other members of a criminal organization. Yet such delay may itself create a necessity for prompt action at a particular time. To the extent that this delay is recognized as a proper element of police discretion it is apparent that arrests without warrant in such cases should be allowed. Beyond this it is difficult in principle to justify cases where grounds for arrest clearly existed at an earlier time and there was no element of potential escape present.3 0 The difficulties presented in determining whether such was the case, however, should counsel restraint in concluding that an officer acted unreasonably in failing to procure a warrant although it may later appear that ample opportunity existed for its issuance."' To recognize that the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant of arrest whenever practicable, however, is not to indicate the lack of equivalence between the requirements for an arrest with or without a warrant. Although a strong insistence upon the issuance of a warrant lends itself more readily to a requirement of equivalence, "$To the extent that an arrest without warrant is used to authorize an extensive search of a home, however, these considerations would not seem applicable and some requirement of necessity should be imposed. Compare Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) S. 257, 270 (1960) . It should be noted that the use of hearsay as the basis for a search or an arrest, when considered in conjunction with the governmental privilege not to disclose the identity of an informer, may create significant problems. In Jones, the Court, with some qualifications, authorized the use of such information to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. To the extent that nondisclosure of identity is allowed, it is apparent that there is a possibility that the alleged hearsay information may exist only in the officer's mind. This possibility becomes substantially more dangerous if such information is subsequently used to justify a search or an arrest previously made without a warrant. Assuming the validity of the Wong Sun v. United States' 4 0 dearly held that an arrest without a warrant could be justified only if the information upon which the officers acted would have been sufficient to justify the issuance of an arrest warrant.
Thus it is clear from both the search and arrest cases that the Fourth Amendment applies the standard of probable cause to determine the validity of an arrest made without a warrant. In the face of these decisions, attempts to authorize arrests on lesser grounds would seem to be assured of invalidity. Yet the right to "arrest" and the right to "detain" are not necessarily synonymous; just as "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment is a word of art due to its equivalence with the requirements for the issuance of a warrant, so also is the term "arrest."
IV. TnE RiGHT or TMPORARY DETENTION

A. The Basis for the Distinction Between "Arrest'" and "Detention"
A doctrine of equivalence between the first and second dauses of the amendment is necessarily based upon a fundamental notion that an officer should not be allowed to act without a warrant in situations where a warrant would not validly issue. Where the nature of the activity is not encompassed within the situations to which a warrant is applicable, however, as in the administrative search cases, 4 ' the reason for the rule fails and with it the rule. The right of temporary detention must rest on similar grounds; it must be established that it is different in kind from those situations to which a warrant is applicable and that, hence, no requirement of probable cause is to be implied. Certain kinds of official detention dearly satisfy this test. Thus it is not difficult to recognize that detention of an insane person or of a lost child or the enforcement of quarantine measures do not require a showing of probable cause; in such a context, the concept of probable cause in informer's privilege, it would seem questionable whether such information from a privileged source should be considered in determining the existence of probable cause.
140 371 U. S. 471 (1963) .
The most logical interpretation of Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217 (1960) , and especially Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959) , is that the searches there upheld are different in kind from searches for which a warrant, and hence probable cause, is required. Reasonableness in a distinguishable context takes on a different meaning. Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (probable cause not required for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum).
[Vol..%5 the traditional sense is not applicable. Other examples in the same general category include the right to detain a witness at the scene of a crime or a material witness who may not remain available to testify"2 and the authority of a police officer to stop an automobile for the purpose of inspecting the operator's license.' Whether some or all of these restraints on liberty should be allowed is a question which can only be answered by a weighing of relative values; that they are different from an arrest for a crime cannot be denied.
Such examples, however, do not substantiate the existence of a similar right of detention for the purposes of enforcement of the criminal law. If the line is to be drawn at an invasion of privacy "which has as its design the securing of information ... which may be used to effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or property, ' " it would seem difficult to consider detention of a suspect as differing from an arrest to the degree that constitutional differentiation is warranted. Yet the distinction may be implied from the amendment itself. The Fourth Amendment does not in terms refer to "arrest"; 415 it does, however, in its second clause impose the traditional qualifications of an arrest upon the issuance of a war- justice of peace cannot well be too tender in his proceedings of this kind, and seems to be punishable not only at the suit of the king, but also of the party grieved, if he grant any such warrant groundlessly and maliciously, without such a probable cause as might induce a candid and impartial man to suspect the party to be guilty."
Hale had earlier indicated the requirement of an oath. 2 HALE, PLEAS Or THE CROWN 110 (1st am. ed. 1847). "But that I may say it once for all, it is fit in all cases of warrants for arresting for felony, much more for suspicion of felony, to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as well whether a felony were done, as also the causes of his suspicion, for he is in this case a competent judge of those circumstances that may induce the granting of a warrant to arrest." arrest although "arrest" itself is not specifically mentioned.
147 If this is accepted, then whatever equivalence that exists between the first and second clauses of the amendment should be limited to "arrests" even though other "seizures" may be utilized as a preliminary step in the enforcement of the criminal law. Thus, "reasonable" as a word of art requiring the existence of probable cause is applicable to arrests without warrants, but does not apply to those seizures which fall short of constituting an arrest.
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Obviously, such an argument requires the existence of a valid distinction between "arrests" and other "seizures" of the person in the context of the criminal law. Although there is some authority that any deprivation of liberty of movement is an arrest,'" the generally accepted definition" 1 ' at common law is "the apprehending or restraining of one's person, in order to be forthcoming to answer an alleged or suspected crime.""' The key words in this definition are, of course, those in the qualifying phrase "in order to be forthcoming to answer an alleged or suspected crime," and it must be admitted that the meaning of this phrase is far from clear. Its ambiguity can be resolved narrowly by interpreting it merely to exclude those situations not involving the enforcement of the criminal law, such as the detention of the insane. 3' Yet it cannot be denied that a broader meaning has some- 403 (1960) . "The most reasonable interpretation of this language would be that it merely distinguishes a restraint the purpose of which is related to the enforcement of the criminal law from the seizure of a lost child in order to return it to its parents, the enforcement of quarantine measures, or the detention of a mentally ill person who requires care and treatment." times been given it, at least insofar as "apprehending or restraining" is defined as a temporary interference with liberty of movement.-3 The latter interpretation, to the extent that it distinguishes between those seizures which can appropriately be termed "arrests" and those which can more appropriately be considered as "detentions," is necessarily adopted by those arguing for the right to detain on lesser grounds of belief. It is fortified by a reliance on the English common law, which purported to recognize such a distinction under certain circumstances. Both the Government' and the draftsmen of the Uniform Arrest Act" 5 rely heavily upon this common law distinction. Such reliance would appear necessary for the purpose of interpreting the amendment; if the framers are to be deemed to have distinguished between an "arrest" and a "detention," it seems essential that such a distinction contemporaneously existed.' For this reason it is appropriate at this point to consider the authorities relied upon in some detail.
B. The Source of the Distinwtion-The English Authorities
Two propositions are sought to be elicited from the early English common law: first, that a power L. Rxv. 509, 522 (1949) . "A man who has merely been approached by an officer and questioned has been 'accosted' but not arrested; and stopping for questioning may be quite proper when an arrest would not be authorized." It should be noted that in those cases authorizing the search of a moving motor vehicle without warrant, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925) Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) .
155 Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rxv. 315, 318 (1942) .
156 Cases such as Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948) , and United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1947) , which hold that in the absence of a federal statute state law governs the validity of an arrest without warrant, should not be confused. Such rulings merely require additional conformance with the law of the state wherein the arrest takes place; they do not, however, justify a lowering of the minimum constitutional standards. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963) S. 84 (1929) . Thus the existence of a provision such as the Uniform Arrest Act could have no effect upon the constitutional requirements imposed by the Fourth Amendment. See 36 NOTRE D ss LAw. 432 (1960 LAw. 432 ( -1961 ; 109 U. PA. L. REv. 262 (1960 Cir. 1960 ).
existed to "detain" on grounds less than probable cause; and second, that the one detaining was not required to proceed after the "detention" in the same manner as was required after an "arrest." A distinction must be drawn between "arrests" and "detentions"; it is not enough merely to find that a person could be arrested in the traditional sense on grounds less than probable cause, because to that extent the common law is repealed by the Fourth Amendment. The failure to recognize this distinction has led some to argue that the arrest of an actualfelon should be lawful per se"' because some authority for it existed at common law.-' 6 This seems clearly unsound in view of the specific constitutional requirement of probable cause.'
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There are a number of difficulties in determining whether such a distinction between "arrests" and "detentions" existed at common law. First of all, the authorities chiefly 8° relied upon, Hale 8 ' and Hawkins, 6 ' do not so neatly categorize the matter; they tend to refer to everything as an "arrest." This should not, however, foreclose the issue; as mentioned before, the distinction rests rather in the totality of the process. The second problem involved in interpreting these writings is the free and easy use made of the term "suspicious." At various points in their discussion of the law of arrest, both writers seemingly use "suspicion," "probable cause for suspicion," and "just suspicion" interchangeably. The use of "suspicion" rather than "belief" is not in itself important; modem writers continue to refer to the authority to arrest as based on "reasonable suspicion" as a synonym for "reasonable belief." 16 [ Vol. 54 lies rather in the implications to be drawn from the absence of a prefix like "just," "probable," or "reasonable." Thus Hale, in discussing the powers of constables, states: "The constable may arrest suspicious nightwalkers by the statute of 5E.3 cap. 14. and men that ride armed in fair or markets or elsewhere. Stat., 2E.3, cap. 3. de Northampton.
"And it appears by the books before-mentioned, that in cases of arrests of this or the like nature, the constable may execute his office upon information and request of others, that suspect and charge the offenders, nay tho it be but with suspicion thereof." 1 6 4 Taken out of context, this statement implies that a lesser ground of suspicion is sufficient authority for an arrest under certain circumstances. Yet it is clear that Hale was not attempting to draw any such distinction; the context in which the statement was made was that of a discussion of those situations in which it was appropriate for the officer to act without first obtaining a warrant' 6 5 He begins this discussion by saying.
"By the original and inherent power in the constable he may for breach of the peace and some misdemeanors, less than felony, imprison a person. "' 6 He then goes on to consider those situations less than felonies, of which a "suspicious night-walker" is one, in which such an arrest was authorized.
The other area in which reference is made to "night-walkers" is in the discussion of the powers of watchmen. There were three kinds of watchmen, and Hale discusses them in order. The first kind are those specially appointed to keep watch in all towns during the night. Of them Hale says: "Their power is to arrest such as pass by until the morning, and if no suspicion, they are then to be delivered, and if suspicion be touching them, they shall be delivered to the sheriff, RFv. 201 (1940 ). See De Salvatore v. State, 163 A.2d 244 (Del. 1960 .
M 2 HAi., PLEAS or TH CROwx 89 (1st am. ed. 1847).
2 65 Indeed, in a footnote to the "suspicious nightwalker" passage by the editor, the ambiguity is clarified. "But then that suspicion must not be a mere causeless suspicion, but must be founded upon some probable reason; and so it was ruled in the case of the Queen and Tooley.... [Chief Justice Holt said] that of late, constables made a practice of taking up people only for walking the streets, but he knew not whence they had the authority." Id. at 89, n.(f).
166 Id. at 88.
viz. to the common gaol, there to remain until they be in due manner delivered .... "1 Since this watch extended only between Ascension day and Michaelmas, the constable was given the power to keep another watch in order to carry out his functions, one of which was, of course, to arrest those who went armed and night-walkers. 16 The third kind of watch was similar to the second but appointed by justices of the peace rather than constables. This watch had the same power as the other two. 69 Here, again, Hale states: "And such a watchman may apprehend nightwalkers and commit them to custody till the morning, and also felons and persons suspected of felony."' 7 0
The ambiguity of the passages in relation to the degree of suspicion is especially apparent at this point. Here, Hale refers only to "night-walkers," without even bothering to designate them as "suspicious." A possible interpretation of this would be that "night-walkers" were subject to arrest whether or not probable cause or even mere suspicion existed. Yet in discussing the watch kept by the constables, he also refers to "persons suspicious either by night or day."' 7 ' Furthermore, reading the passage in light of his general discussion of the powers of peace officers, it would appear that a "night-walker" was, ex hypothesi, a "suspicious night-walker." In referring to the powers of all peace officers in an earlier passage, Hale had said:
"And hence it is, that these officers, that are thus intrusted, may without any other warrant but from themselves arrest felons, and those that are probably suspected of felonies.., nay for breach of the peace or just suspicion thereof, as nightwalkers, persons unduly armed .... ,2 It must be admitted however, that this is not entirely clear as to watchmen. If a watchman is to free those whom no suspicion "be touching" in the morning, then it would seem that suspicion was not necessary for the arrest during the night.
The case of the "suspicious night-walker" was also given consideration by Hawkins in discussing 17 Id. at 96. 168 See text accompanying note 164 supra. In addition to "night-walkers" Hale mentions "persons suspicious either by night or day." The statutory authorization for this is the same as for the power of constables to arrest night-walkers. the power of both private citizensu 3 and peace officers to arrest without warrant. As to such power in a private person, he first lists six "sufficient causes" upon which to base an arrest for a felony 74 The implication that reasonable grounds must be shown is more clearly expressed in a later passage as follows:
"It seems to be certain, that whoever would justify the arrest of an innocent person by reason of any such suspicion, must not only shew that he suspected the party himself, but must also set forth the cause which induced him to have such a suspicion, that it may appear to the court to have been a sufficient ground for his proceed-
ing.,YY75
Then on the same page, he moves from the consideration of felonies to lesser offenses and changes the discussion from the degree of suspicion to the nature of the offense.
"As to the arrest of offenders by private persons of their own authority, permitted by law for inferior offences, it seems clear, that regularly no private person can of his own authority arrest another for a bare breach of the peace after it is over; for if an officer cannot justify such an arrest without a warrant from a magistrate, surely a fortiori a private person cannot. Yet it is holden by some, that any private person may lawfully arrest a suspicious night-walker, and detain him till he makes it appear that he is a person of good reputation. Also it hath been adjudged, that any one may apprehend a common notorious cheat going about the country with false dice, and being actually caught playing with them, in order to have him before a justice of peace, for the public good requires the utmost discouragement of all such persons; and the restraining of private persons from arresting them without a warrant from a magistrate, would often give them an opportunity of escaping. And from the reason of this case it seems to follow, that the arrest of any other offenders by private persons, for offences in like manner scandalous and prejudicial to the public, may be justified. "' 176 From the full statement it clearly appears that Hawkins was not attempting to distinguish between the necessary degrees of suspicion; like Hale he was merely categorizing those situations in which an arrest not made by authority of a warrant was permissible. Furthermore, the reference to "common notorious cheats" and "offences in like manner scandalous and prejudicial to the public" in the same passage indicates that some just cause of suspicion was considered necessary. Hawkins goes on in the next chapter to consider this situation in relation to the power of watchmen.
In beginning the discussion of watchmen, he says: "As to the power of watchmen, it is further exacted by the said statute of Winchester, C. 4. 'that if any stranger do pass by the watch, he shall be arrested until morning. And if no suspicion be found, he shall go quit; and if they find cause of suspicion, they shall forthwith deliver him to the sheriff and the sheriff may receive him without damage, and shall keep him safely until he be acquitted in due manner...
Again, as in the quotation from Hale, it seems necessarily implied that no suspicion, probable or otherwise, is required for such an arrest by the terms of the statute. Yet Hawkins goes on to say: "It is holden that this statute was made in affirmance of the common law, and that every private person may by the common law arrest any suspicious night-walker, and detain him till he give a good account of himself, as hath been more fully shewn in the precedent chapter, section twenty."'
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A further indication that the suspicion must be for just cause is supplied in a later passage when he states that this same statute implies the existence of a similar power to arrest in bailiffs.
"And surely it cannot be doubted but that by force hereof such bailiffs may lawfully arrest and detain any such stranger, being found under probable circumstances of suspicion, till he shall give a good account of himself."' 7 Thus it can hardly be said that a clear conclusion can be reached from a consideration of these writings. Early judicial authority is similarly unclear. In The Queen v. Tooley' 80 the court rejected an argument that the fact that a constable recognized a girl as one he had previously arrested for disorderly conduct gave him sufficient grounds to arrest her in the present case. hard, that the liberty of the subject should depend on the will of the constable, and shall his not liking a woman's looks be any cause of suspicion?"18 Yet in Lawrence v. Hedger, 8 3 the court upheld a detention in the most typical of what would be now considered a "suspicious circumstances" case. The plaintiff had been walking through the London streets at ten o'clock in the evening when he was stopped by a watchman; upon failure to satisfactorily explain himself he was taken to jail. The next morning he was discharged. The court said that the existence of such a power in watchmen during the night was essential and that there were sufficient grounds in the present case. "And, in this case, what do you talk of groundless suspicion? There was abundant ground of suspicion here. We should be very sorry if the law were otherwise."'
14
From the authority considered it would seem at least doubtful whether any lesser degree of suspicion for a detention other than an arrest was clearly recognized at common law. Even if lesser grounds were sufficient to arrest a night-walker, it is clear that at least insofar as constables were concerned, it implied no power to detain other than through the ordinary process of arrest. 5 ' However, the power of watchmen to detain nightwalkers until morning "and if no suspicion be found, he shall go quit" seems necessarily to imply both that a lesser standard than "probable cause" was satisfactory and that taking them before a justice or magistrate was not required. Yet it should be recognized that this conclusion does not inevitably follow. . "I come now in the last place to consider what the constable is to do with his prisoner that he hath thus arrested for felony or other causes above-mentioned." He goes on to say that the constable may put him in the stocks if intoxicated or take him to the sheriff or to jail: "But the safest and best way in all cases, is to bring them to a justice of peace, and by them the prisoner may be bailed or committed, as the case shall require .... " Ibid. (Emphasis added.) until he gives a good account of himself or even to commit him overnight can be squared with an arrest based on probable cause. Although the proposition is not universally accepted 8 ' there is modern authority that an officer may release one who was validly arrested if it becomes apparent that a reasonable mistake has been made.
1 6 3 Furthermore, there is authority both at common law 88 and at the present time 89 that the requirement of prompt arraignment does not mean that a magistrate or justice of the peace must be awakened in the middle of the night.
It must be admitted, however, that the power of the watchmen went far beyond these limited privileges. Thus, it would seem highly arguable that, under certain circumstances, a distinction between "arrests" and other forms of "seizure" or "detention" existed at common law. To the extent that this distinction is incorporated into the Fourth Amendment, serious questions are raised as to its proper safeguards and limitations.
C. The Nature of the Right-A New Definition of
"Cnreasonable"
The Initial Apprehension
One of the strongest arguments against allowing detention on lesser grounds than are required to justify an arrest is the difficulty involved in setting new standards of reasonableness. "If probable cause is no longer to be the test, at least at the initial point of arrest, where is the line to be drawn short of indiscriminate police detentions based on hunch?"'
8 0 Yet probable causel itself is not a magic formula to be automatically applied to the facts of a particular case. Although within the context of the amendment probable cause must require a uniform amount of pre-arrest information in every case," implications are not lacking that 188 See 1 ALExAMDER, ARREsT 637-39 (1949) . 187 Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 254 (1940) .
188 Hale recognized that this power to detain existed at night when the justice could not be reached. S. 402, 407 (1960) .
"'The traditional formulation of the law of arrest is reasonable grounds to believe. The Court has equated this with probable cause within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) .
192 Probable cause, in other words, must be inter-this standard has been relaxed in particular circumstances, 02 and the recent decisions raising hearsay information to constitutional respectability' indicate that the requisite belief need not be created by information personally obtained through contact with or observation of the person to be arrested.' 95 Even assuming the existence of a consistent standard does not, however, aid in the analysis of its content. It is apparent that no precise meanings can be attributed to words such as "suspicion" and "belief" or their counterparts when prefixed with "reasonable" or "probable"; the basis for a distinction can lie only in their relative meanings when subjected to a critical comparison. Only by first realizing that precision of definition cannot be attained is it possible to avoid these ambiguities and approach a satisfactory analysis.
It would seem that two basic elements can be distilled from the concept of probable cause. 332 (1956-1957) .
195 An argument has also been made that these cases indicate a relaxation of the standard of probable cause rather than merely increasing the relevant scope of the officer's inquiry. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. Cx. REv. 46, 65-70. See note 192 supra. 196Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) . extent, it seems to embody the specific requirements of particular description imposed by the words of the amendment itself upon the issuance of a warrant 1 7 and thus expresses the policy against generality at which the amendment was primarily directed.
9 s If a showing of probability is required, a general warrant, by hypothesis, can never issue, and mass arrests would be invalid.'
99 From this element of probable cause, a relative distinction between the meanings conveyed by the terms "suspicion" and "belief" 2 1 0 may be elicited. In such a classification "suspicion" would lie generally in the area of possibility and "belief" in that of probability. Whatever the semantic difficulties and the problems of borderline cases, such a distinction for purposes of analysis seems worthwhile.
On the assumption, then, that one of the elements of probable cause is that of probability as distinguished from possibility, of "belief" as distinguished from "suspicion," the second basic element remains to be considered. In the most quoted definition of probable cause, the Court asserted its existence if the information possessed by the officers was sufficient "to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" ' 2 1' that articles subject to search and seizure were involved. It is thus dear that the test of probable cause imposes an objective, rather than a subjective, standard. A mere good faith belief that an individual has committed a crime or that objects subject to seizure are within a house or car will not satisfy the test; it must, in addition, be a reasonable belief. 199 Even here, however, a word of caution must be added. It is not clear that "probable" is to be interpreted to mean "more probable than not." If it is clear that either A or B is solely guilty of a crime, does probable cause to arrest either or both exist? For an affirmative answer to this question but couched in nonconstitutional terms, see Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. Rlv. 201, 238 (1940) United States, 364 U. S. 863 (1960) . 209 Sections two and four of the Uniform Arrest Act require "reasonable ground to believe" to justify an arrest and "reasonable ground to suspect" to justify a detention. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942 manner, an objective or subjective test can be applied to a "suspicion" or "possibility." To this extent, a relative distinction can be drawn between a "reasonable suspicion" and a "mere suspicion or hunch."
With this analysis as a background, it is thus possible to determine the variations of the standard of probable cause which might serve as lesser grounds for the authorization of a detention. If probable cause under the prior analysis can be defined as a reasonable belief in the probability that a crime has been committed, the possible variations would be as follows:
Possibility Number One-"Good Faith Belief." In order for a detention to be valid, the condition of the officer's mind must be such that he actually believes that the person detained is probably guilty of a crime. It is not necessary that other men would reasonably have reached the same conclusion; it is only required that this particular officer actually so believed. It is necessary, however, for the belief to be as to the probability of guilt of a crime. Normally this will require a corresponding belief that a specific crime has been committed, and thus detention on suspicion of criminality generally is not allowed.
Possibility Number Two-"Reasonable Suspicion." In order for a detention to be valid, the officer must reasonably and in good faith suspect the individual detained of being involved in some form of criminality. A mere good faith suspicion will not suffice; it must be such that a reasonable man would also entertain it. However, it is not necessary for the officer to have a specific crime in mind, or if he does, to believe that the person detained probably committed it. Suspicion in this context means that it must be reasonably possible that the individual has committed some crime.
Possibility Number Three--"Good Faith Suspicion." The test for determining the validity of a detention is whether the officer in good faith suspects an individual of engaging in some form of criminal activity. It is not necessary that the suspicion be one which reasonable men would also have, and the officer is not required to have specific acts of criminality in mind. If he does have some such specific crime in mind, it is not necessary for him to believe that the person detained probably committed it. Suspicion in this context means that cumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed." (Emphasis added.) the officer must in good faith believe that it is possible that the individual has committed some crime.
i
It should be noted that each of these possibilities follows the general theory of the concept of probable cause to the extent that an emphasis is placed upon the degree of mental conviction necessary to authorize a detention. In this context, it would seem that possibility number two requiring "reasonable suspicion" is closely analogous to the meaning conveyed by the formulation of the Uniform Arrest Act in terms of "reasonable ground to suspect ' " and would present the best compromise available short of probable cause. Yet it has been asserted that reasonable grounds to detain, unlike reasonable grounds to arrest, can be found in factors extraneous to the officer's state of mind. Thus, the argument of the government in Rios v. United States°5 suggested that the test be "reasonable grounds for inquiry" 2 6 and formulated it as follows:
"As to investigation of completed crimes, the seriousness of the offense, the proximity to or remoteness from the scene of the crime, the amount of time which had elapsed, the suspicious circumstances involved, would all have to be weighed. As to suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed, all the factors giving rise to suspicion would have to be considered in relation to the nature of the detention.,207 Such an argument contains much that is to be praised; if the relatively specific requirement of probable cause is to be disregarded and a lesser 203 All three possibilities should be read in light of a general policy against the use of the detention privilege for purposes of harassment. Such police activities, although not unknown in this country, cannot be constitutionally sanctioned. For a discussion of a particular example of police harassment of "known criminals" in Philadelphia, see Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 34-36 (1957 S. 160, 179 (1949) . "Government agents are commissioned to represent the interests of the public in the enforcement of the law and this requires affirmative action not only when there is reasonable ground for an arrest or probable cause for a search but when there is reasonable ground for an investigation."
207 Brief for United States, p. 25.
degree of belief submitted in its place, then other factors should be taken into consideration to further safeguard individual rights. To that extent, the factors listed are representative of those interests to be balanced in determining reasonableness under all the circumstances. The test, however, presents some significant problems. It is apparent that it would contribute to an officer's uncertainty and make "unreasonable" turn even more on the ad hoc reaction of a particular court.'" Moreover, the use of additional factors in determining reasonableness is a double-edged sword; depending upon the seriousness of the crime, a greater or lesser degree of suspicion is required. Presumably the use of such a sliding scale would uphold detentions where the public interest was very high even though no suspicion existed. 211 The full quotation is as follows: "But if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it Whatever the justification for dispensing with individual liberties in situations where grave emergendes are involved,m it does not necessarily follow that events occurring in the day-to-day enforcement of the law should be classified within a continuum of more or less serious injuries to the public interest. Such a test would seem difficult enough for a court, with adequate opportunity for detached reflection, to apply; it becomes doubly so, and hence more dangerous to individual liberties, when it is remembered that the initial decision will generally be made by a policeman whose primary goal is to ferret out crime.O Thus it is clear that consideration of the seriousness of the crime involved as a factor in determining reasonableness presents grave difficulties. Recognition of these difficulties should temper enthusiasm with caution; it does not indicate, however, that such a test would be so flexible as to be unworkable. A balancing of interests approach is not necessarily unique to the problem of temporary detention; it has been employed in other areas of the Fourth Amendment itself. Although Frank v. Maryland'" specifically turned on the absence of criminal law enforcement, it is an important precedent in the area of temporary detention for two reasons. It illustrates the willingness of the Court to recognize that the traditional protections of the Fourth Amendment may be flexibly interpreted when faced with a high degree of public interest,O6 might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger." Ibid. It should be noted, moreover, that this illustration by Mr. Justice Jackson was used to emphasize the pettiness of the case before him, in which he would not uphold the search. 470 (1948) , the court held that an action would lie to prevent the expenditure of public funds by restraining Los Angeles police officers from conducting unconstitutional blockages (stopping and searching both automobiles and pedestrians).
214359 U. S. 360 (1959) . 211 Even the dissent indicated a willingness to dilute the specific requirement of probable cause, although it would require the showing to be made to a magistrate. "Experience may show the need for periodic [Vol. 54 and it shows that the Court considers itself capable of weighing various factors and balancing interests in order to conclude whether a governmental invasion of privacy was or was not reasonable. The only distinction between this and the right of temporary detention is the element of criminal procedure; a greater risk is involved when the restraint is a preliminary step in the process which may ultimately lead to trial and conviction. Admittedly the danger to the security of the individual is greater under such circumstances. Yet it is not contended that this increased risk is to be treated as irrevelant; its consideration is necessarily inherent in the nature of the balancing test involved. Experience in other areas of the law shows that the element of risk can be weighed along with the value of the interests protected and the social need for the conduct pursued. 2 1 6 Furthermore, it need not follow that such flexible standards wil indefinitely necessitate an ad hoc process of decision. By a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, specific limits could emerge in a relatively short period of time while providing an opportunity in the interim to ascertain their practical effects upon law enforcement methods and procedures. The development of specific standards from broad principles is especially appropriate for the process of constitutional interpretation and, in fact, has been utilized in determining the applicability of Fourth Amendment standards in other areas. On the question of health inspections, for example, at least four members of the Court have expressed the opinion that no prior information about the existence of specific unsanitary conditions is required.
217 Still another inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The standards set for a determination of negligence in the law of torts seem to serve as an appropriate analog, for the present problem. See PROSSER, TORTS §30 at 123 (2d ed. 1955) . "It is fundamental that the standard of conduct which is the basis of the law of negligence is determined by balancing the risk, in the light of the social value of the interest threatened, and the probability and extent of the harm, against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued." 217 See separate opinion of Justices Clark, Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U. S. 264 (1959) (noting probable jurisdicinstance of the crystallization of Fourth Amendment standards in the absence of probable cause can be found in the so-called "constructive search" cases involving the validity of subpoenas duces tecum. The spirit of the early cases was to test their validity in the same manner as that of a search, 2 18 while recent decisions show a recognition of the complexity of business regulation and authorize such subpoenas when reasonable grounds for investigation exist. 219 Moreover, the present trend is to regard the demands as presumptively "reasonable" and to enforce them in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary.22° It would seem that certain recurring instances of temporary detention could ultimately be specifically classified in like manner.nl
The final factor to be considered in determining the validity of a detention under the first clause of the Fourth Amendment is the degree of inconvenience caused to the individual. Although this factor is of primary importance in determining the permissible nature and extent of a detention, it may also have limited applicability to the validity of the initial apprehension itself. The first distinction which may be sought is that between the stopping of a pedestrian and the stopping of a moving motor vehicle.2 --Much reliance has been placedm upon statements by the Supreme Court that travelers on the highway are entitled to unretion). The judgment was later affirmed per curiam by an equally divided Court in 364 U. S. 263 (1960) Cumr. L., C. & P. S. 402, 407-08 (1960) . stricted freedom of movement.m A These statements, however, were directed to the validity of searches for which probable cause was required. To impart them into a discussion concerning the validity of temporary detention is to assume the very issue to be decided.us From the standpoint of inconvenience to the individual, however, the two situations would appear to be substantially identical; the only difference being that when an automobile is stopped the existence of an actual restraint is more apparent. The Supreme Court has never heard a case where it was asserted that the mere stopping of a pedestrian constituted an arrest; for obvious reasons the officer will normally take great pains to avoid any indication that the individual is under an actual restraint.u 6 When an automobile is stopped, however, the situation is not ambiguous; it is untenable to assert that no actual restraint has been imposed. Thus, assuming the existence of an actual interference with liberty of movement in both cases, a per se distinction between a moving vehicle and a pedestrian would appear to be invalid. This is not to say, however, that the initial apprehension of those in a moving motor vehicle may not present distinctive problems. Because of the element of speed and road conditions, it would dearly require a higher degree of suspicion and public interest to justify an apprehension, such as by forcing a car off the road,m which created a serious risk of physical or emotional injury to the occupants.n ' This is equally true, of course, even in the presence of probable cause;
224 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153-54 (1925) . " [T] hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is [probable cause]." See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 177 (1949) . 225 The right to stop and search should not be confused with the right merely to stop. Although the Court's language in the cases cited in note 224 supra is broad enough to foreclose the detention question, different issues are involved. See cases cited note 143 supra. 226 For an analysis of the distinction between a "command" and a "request" in this area, see Williams, Police Detention and Arrest Privileges Under Foreign Law- England, 51 J. Calt. L., C. & P. S. 413 (1960) .
227 This method was upheld in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949) . The inconvenience caused to the individual by merely interfering with his forward progress, either in a car or on foot, would normally seem minor enough to be countenanced in light of the public interests involved. A final factor representing potential injury to the individual, however, remains to be considered. Just as an arrest may cause damage to a person's reputation, 2 1 the same may be true of a mere stopping under certain circumstances. Again the problem of the automobile seems to stand conspicuously apart from the situation of the pedestrian. Because the existence of the restraint will often not be apparent when a pedestrian is stopped, the corresponding danger to his reputation is diminished. The automobile presents another unique situation due to the fact that its very nature invites application of the modern counterpart of the general warrant, the roadblock. It has been argued that the siguificance of such generality in apprehension lies in the limited suspicion directed toward any given individual. To that extent the potential injury to reputation is substantially avoidedm Yet, whatever the effect such considerations should have in emergency situationsm and those involving enforcement of traffic codes,m they would seem of extremely doubtful validity as applied to routine enforcement of the criminal law. Reliance upon such a rationale is contrary to the fundamental policy of the Fourth Amendment; nothing can be imagined which would cast less suspicion upon any particular person than the continued use of general warrants. With this reservation, however, the element of a moving motor vehicle should be considered in determining the reasonableness of the initial apprehension. 664, 701 (1961) . "A road block and search of all passing cars for fleeing robbers implies only limited suspicion of any given driver; a house-to-house search for a notorious criminal thought to be in the neighborhood may be equally innocuous from this standpoint. What the innocent citizen has most reason to fear is being singled out as the object of official suspicion." 2 See, e.g., note 211 supra. 
IVol. 54 THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAIV OF ARREST
The Nature and Extent of the Detention
There are a limited number of judicial decisions upholding the right of a police officer to stop a pedestrian for the purpose of making inquiry.m' Other cases have held that a similar right exists to stop an automobile. 5 Most of the cases which have been cited for this proposition, however, involved factual situations in which the individual was not in the process of movement when inquiry was made.ne Moreover, even those cases which authorize an actual interference with movement by an initial stopping do not stand for the proposition that any further restraint can be imposed. With the exception of United States v. Bonanno,2 subsequent events gave rise to probable cause, and the issue was thus avoided. Frequently, the courts made dear that in the absence of these events no right to detain would have existed.ns Furthermore, in other cases where an actual restraint was imposed, the courts have held that an arrest was thereby consummated. circumstances may be the only solution to the present problem which can honestly be said to fulfill the policy of the constitutional provision.a
The sole objection to such a test must necessarily lie in its vagueness. Doubtless, this would present some difficulty in initial application. Yet there is no reason to suspect that the Court would be incapable of eliciting fundamental standards through a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. Thus it would seem difficult to conclude that the vice of vagueness is a sufficient reason for discarding a formulation of reasonableness under all the circumstances; a certain amount of such vagueness is rather of the essence of a constitutional principle.
217 Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 63.
